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Abstract. In this paper, we address the problem of computing the similarity between two users (according
to their profiles) while preserving their privacy in a fully decentralized system and for the passive adversary
model. First, we introduce a two-party protocol for privately computing a threshold version of the similarity
and apply it to well-known similarity measures such as the scalar product and the cosine similarity. The
output of this protocol is only one bit of information telling whether or not two users are similar beyond
a predetermined threshold. Afterwards, we explore the computation of the exact and threshold similarity
within the context of differential privacy. Differential privacy is a recent notion developed within the field
of private data analysis guaranteeing that an adversary that observes the output of the differentially
private mechanism, will only gain a negligible advantage (up to a privacy parameter) from the presence (or
absence) of a particular item in the profile of a user. This provides a strong privacy guarantee that holds
independently of the auxiliary knowledge that the adversary might have. More specifically, we design several
differentially private variants of the exact and threshold protocols that rely on the addition of random noise
tailored to the sensitivity of the considered similarity measure. We also analyze their complexity as well
as their impact on the utility of the resulting similarity measure. Finally, we provide experimental results
validating the effectiveness of the proposed approach on real datasets.
1 Introduction
In the Web 2.0, more and more personal data are released by users (queries, social network, geolo-
cated data. . . ), which creates a huge pool of useful information to leverage in the context of search or
recommendation for instance. In fully decentralized systems, tapping on the power of this information
usually involves some kind of clustering process that relies on an exchange of personal data (such as
profiles) to compute similarity between users [2]. In this paper, we address the problem of computing
similarity between users while preserving their privacy and without relying on a central entity. Disso-
ciating the identifiers of users from their data, through the use of pseudonyms for instance, is clearly
not sufficient to protect their privacy. In fact, just looking at these Personal Identifiable Information
(PII) may sometimes be enough to infer the identity of the associated users thus causing a privacy
breach [3, 22, 21]. Moreover, to preserve the fully distributed nature of such systems, no trusted third
party (e.g. central server) should be required.
In this paper, we propose a protocol based on cryptographic primitives that computes the simi-
larity between two user profiles (represented as vectors) in such a way that each user only learns the
output of the similarity computation but not the profiles themselves. The novelty of our approach is
twofold. First, considering well-known similarity metrics, namely scalar product and cosine similarity,
we propose a two-party threshold similarity protocol for these metrics and prove its security against
a passive adversary. Instead of revealing the exact value of the similarity, this protocol outputs only
one bit of information stating whether or not two users are similar beyond a predetermined threshold.
Compared to the exact similarity computation from which more information can be extracted, this
protocol is more privacy-preserving in the sense that it reveals less information. While, we focus on
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the scalar product and the cosine similarity for illustration purpose, our method is generic enough to
be applied to other similarity metrics.
Second, we go beyond the traditional cryptographic framework by analyzing the similarity compu-
tation within the context of differential privacy [9]. In a nutshell, differential privacy is an orthogonal
and complementary notion to cryptography that, by adding random noise to the output of a function,
provides strong privacy guarantees with respect to how well an adversary observing the output of the
function can deduce the presence (or absence) of a specific item in a profile. We design a differentially
private protocol for the exact and threshold similarity and analyze their impact with respect to utility.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to address differential privacy in the context of
distributed similarity computation. More specifically, we first analyze the sensitivity of these similarity
metrics in the context of a protocol computing exactly the similarity between two user profiles. Finally,
we also study the impact of the differential privacy (which requires the addition of random noise) on
the resulting utility of the similarity measure, both through a theoretical analysis and experimental
validation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the system model and provides the required
background. In Section 3, we introduce the threshold similarity protocol and prove its security with
respect to a passive adversary. In Section 4, we describe differentially-private protocols for the exact
and threshold similarity, while in Section 5, we provide a theoretical analysis of the impact on utility
of the differentially-private protocol as well as experimental results. Finally, we briefly review related
work in Section 6 before concluding.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the system model, the definitions of the similarity metrics considered, and
the background in cryptography required in the context of our contributions.
System model. We consider a distributed system of n nodes, connected via an unstructured
network [17]. (Each node is typically connected toO(log n) other nodes picked uniformly at random [4].)
The nodes need to periodically run a clustering protocol that requires computing similarity between
pairs of nodes. This semantic clustering can later be used to improve the search, provide content
recommendation or personalized query expansion. Nodes are characterized by their profile representing
their interests. For example, a node’s profile can be a vector of items the associated user has tagged
using a collaborative system [1] such as delicious4. We assume that for two different nodes A and
B, their profiles SA and SB can be represented as binary vectors of size l, where l is the size of the
domain. More precisely, SA = {a1, . . . , al} and SB = {b1, . . . , bl}, such that ai = 1 if item i is in A’s
profile and 0 otherwise (bi is defined similarly for the second node). For illustration purpose, we shall
call the first node Alice and the second node Bob in the rest of the paper.
The profile is a personal and private information that should be protected, and therefore our main
concern is how to compute the similarity measure while preserving its privacy. In this context, this
means not revealing the content of the profile and restricting the possibility for an adversary to infer the
presence or absence of a particular item in this profile. Moreover, besides the private computation of
the similarity, we also assume the existence of a bidirectional anonymous lossless channel to break the
link between a node’s identity and its profile. Although, it is not the focus of this paper to detail how
such a channel could be implemented in practice, we describe in Appendix A a simple implementation
of this channel called gossip-on-behalf 5 that relies on the use of a third node acting as an anonymizer to
break the link between the two nodes computing their similarity. Obviously, other implementations of
the bidirectional anonymous channel are possible but they require non-trivial modifications of current
4 http://delicious.com/
5 The protocol described here is a modification of a protocol published earlier [4].
anonymous communication networks [5, 26, 8] and are beyond the scope of this paper6. In order to
guarantee a high level of anonymity, as measured for instance by the size of the anonymity set, it is
also necessary to assume that the size of the network is sufficiently large (n 3). Moreover, in order to
avoid the possibility for an adversary to query several times the similarity computation with different
forged profiles, it is also necessary to restrict to limit the use of a particular bidirectional anonymous
channel (for instance to use it only once).
Similarity measures. Nodes aim at detecting the most similar other nodes (i.e. those which share
similar interests). Thus, we assume the existence of similarity measures that can be used by the two
nodes to quantify how similar they are. A similarity measure sim is a function that takes as input
two sets SA and SB representing the profiles of users Alice and Bob and outputs a value in the range
between 0 and 1 (i.e. sim(SA, SB) ∈ [0, 1]), where 0 indicates that the sets are entirely different (the
profiles have no items in common) while 1 means that the sets are identical (and therefore the users
can be considered as sharing exactly the same interests).
The cosine similarity is commonly used to assess the similarity between two sets [4] and can be
seen as a normalized overlap between the sets. Formally, it is defined as
|SA ∩ SB|√|SA| × |SB| , (1)
where SA and SB are the private sets of the first and second node respectively and |SA| and |SB|
their corresponding sizes (i.e. the number of 1s in their profiles for binary vectors). The size of the
set intersection between SA and SB (i.e. |SA ∩ SB|) is equivalent to the scalar product in the case
where the sets are represented as binary vectors. For instance, the scalar product of two vectors of
length l, a = (a1, · · · , a`) and b = (b1, · · · , b`), is defined as
∑`
i=1 aibi. Other similarity metrics can be
considered such as the Jaccard index [16], but for the sake of clarity, we focus on the cosine similarity
metric and the scalar product in the sequel.
Cryptographic background. In this paper, we only consider privacy against a computationally-
bounded passive adversary (also sometimes called semi-honest or honest-but-curious) that can control
a fraction of the nodes (see [14] for a formal cryptographic definition). Note that in this model (contrary
to the active one), nodes do not misbehave and follow the recipe of the protocol. However, they may
try to infer as much information as possible regarding the private inputs of other participants from
the interactions and messages they have seen and recorded.
Definition 1 (Privacy – passive adversary [14]). A protocol is said to be private with respect to
passive adversary controlling a node (or a collusion of nodes), if this adversary cannot learn (except
with negligible probability) more information from the execution of the protocol that it could from its
own input (i.e. the inputs of the nodes he controls) and the output of the protocol.
In our work, we rely on a cryptographic primitive known as homomorphic encryption, which allows
to perform arithmetic operations (such as addition and/or multiplication) on encrypted values.
Definition 2 (Homomorphic cryptosystem). Consider a public-key (asymmetric) cryptosystem
where (1) Encpk(a) denotes the encryption of the message a under the public key pk and (2) Decsk(a) =
a is the decryption of this message with the secret key7 sk. A cryptosystem is additively homomorphic
if there is an efficient operation ⊕ on two encrypted messages such that Dec(Enc(a)⊕Enc(b)) = a+ b.
Moreover, such an encryption scheme is called affine if there is also an efficient scalaring operation 
taking as input a ciphertext and a plaintext, such that Dec(Enc(c) a) = c× a.
6 However, see http://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html for a description of how to build an anony-
mous server that can be accessed by anonymous users within the network of the Tor project.
7 In order to simplify the notation, we drop the indices and write Enc(a) instead of Encpk(a) and Dec(a) instead of
Decsk(a) for the rest of the paper.
Besides, the elementary operations of addition and multiplication, more complex arithmetic op-
erations can also be performed on the ciphertexts, such as for instance protocols for the comparison
of integers [12, 23]. These protocols take as input two encrypted integers and output whether or not
they correspond to the same integer or which one is greater than the other, but without revealing the
corresponding plaintexts (i.e. values of the integers).
Paillier’s cryptosystem [25] is an instance of a homomorphic encryption scheme that is both addi-
tive and affine. Moreover, Paillier’s cryptosystem is also semantically secure [14], which means that a
computationally-bounded adversary cannot derive non-trivial information about the plain text m en-
crypted from the cipher text Enc(m) and the public key pk. For instance, a computationally-bounded
adversary who is given two different cipher texts encrypted with the same key of a semantic cryp-
tosystem, cannot even decide with non-negligible probability if the two cipher texts correspond to
the encryption of the same plain text or not. This is because a semantically secure cryptosystem is
by essence probabilistic, meaning that even if the same message is encrypted twice, the two resulting
ciphertexts will be different except with negligible probability. In this paper, we also use a threshold
version of the Paillier’s cryptosystem [7].
Definition 3 (Threshold cryptosystem). A (t, n) threshold cryptosystem is a public cryptosystem
where at least t > 1 nodes out of n need to actively cooperate in order to decrypt an encrypted message.
In particular, no collusion of even (t − 1) nodes can decrypt a cipher text. However, any node may
encrypt a value on its own using the public-key pk. After the threshold cryptosystem has been set up,
each node i gets as a result his own secret key ski (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
The cooperation between nodes for the decryption usually involves an interactive cryptographic
protocol during which several nodes need to combine their own secret keys with an encrypted value
to be able to perform the corresponding decryption.
3 Threshold Similarity Protocol
The threshold similarity protocol preserves privacy by outputting only one bit of information stating
whether (or not) the similarity between two profiles is above some well-chosen threshold τ . To this
end, we define thereafter the notion of threshold similarity.
Definition 4 (Threshold similarity). Two nodes are τ -similar if the output of applying a similarity
measure sim on their respective profiles is above a certain threshold 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 (i.e. sim(SA, SB) > τ).
A threshold similarity protocol takes as input two profiles SA and SB (one profile per node) and
outputs one bit of information, which is 1 if SA and SB are τ -similar (i.e. sim(SA, SB) > τ for sim a
predefined similarity measure and τ the value of the threshold) and 0 otherwise. In practice, the value
of the threshold τ is application dependent and is set empirically so as to be significantly above the
average similarity between nodes in the population. The threshold similarity is very appealing with
respect to privacy as it guarantees that the output of the similarity computation only reveals one bit
of information, which is potentially much less than disclosing the exact value of the similarity measure.
As a practical illustration, we show how to compute privately the cosine similarity between two profiles
(Equation 1) represented as binary vectors using an algorithm that we called ThresholdCosine. Note
that our approach is generic enough to accommodate other similarity metrics such as for example
Jaccard index or Hamming distance. The value of the threshold is set once and for all in advance and
therefore the adversary cannot perform a kind of binary with different values for τ .
As a preprocessing step to this protocol, the two nodes engage in the setup phase of a distributed
key generation protocol of a threshold affine homomorphic cryptosystem [7] (see for instance [24] for
a detailed description of a distributed key generation protocol without a trusted third party for the
Paillier cryptosystem). At the end of this key generation phase, both nodes receive the same public
key pk and each one of them gets as private input a different secret key, respectively skA for the first
node and skB for the second node. The threshold cryptosystem
8 is such that any node can encrypt a
value using the public key pk but that the decryption of a homomorphically encrypted value requires
the active cooperation of the two nodes.
At the beginning of the protocol, the two nodes compute the (encrypted) size of the set intersection
of their two profiles SA and SB by using one of the several algorithms that can be found in the literature.
Once this is done, the nodes only receive as output a ciphertext that is an encrypted version of the size
(and not the size itself in plaintext). Let k denote the number of items in a profile and l is the size of
the domain (e.g. in the dataset delicious k is around 200 items and l is approximately 1 million items).
Some of the state-of-the-art algorithms work directly with profiles represented as sets while others are
specifically designed to compute the scalar product when profiles are represented as binary vectors.
For instance, the two-party scalar product protocol proposed by Goethals [13] provides semantic
security for one node and information-theoretic security for the other one, for a communication cost
of O(l) bits and a computational complexity in terms of cryptographic operations of O(l) for each
node. Other recent protocols for scalar product can be found in the litterature [28, 29], but they have
roughly the same complexities as Goethals’ protocol. Regarding the cardinality of the set intersection,
a protocol presented in [19] also provides semantic security for a communication cost of O(k log l) and
a computational complexity of O(k2). Apart from those specific algorithms, generic techniques from
secure multiparty computation could also be used but in general they are less efficient (see for instance
an analysis in [19]). In the rest of the paper, we denote by ScalarProduct the subroutine corresponding
to the use of the protocol of Goethals [13].
Afterwards, instead of computing directly the cosine similarity as denoted in Equation (1), we
avoid the need for performing a square root on encrypted values (an operation which is non-trivial and
often costly) by squaring the whole equation. The squaring operation renders the next cryptographic
operations easier while preserving at the same time the order relation. Formally, the similarity metric
effectively used in ThresholdCosine is
|SA ∩ SB|2
|SA| × |SB| . (2)
On one hand for obtaining the numerator, we square the output of the scalar product by applying
the multiplication gate from [6] to multiply it by itself. On the other hand, the denominator can
be computed by the first node sending its homomorphically-encrypted set cardinality to the second
node (i.e. Enc(|SA|)), who scalarizes it by its own set cardinality by doing Enc(|SA|) |SB| to obtain
Enc(|SA| × |SB|). Recall, that the objective of the ThresholdCosine protocol is only to learn if the
similarity between SA and SB is above a certain (publicly known) threshold τ . We assume that the
threshold can be represented as a fraction τ = a/b and therefore our goal is to verify whether or not
the following condition holds
|SA ∩ SB|2
|SA| × |SB| >
a
b
⇔ b|SA ∩ SB|2 > a|SA| × |SB|. (3)
The left side and right side of the inequality can be compared by using secure protocols for integer
comparison [12, 23]. We choose to apply specifically the comparison technique from [23] as it does not
require knowledge of the input as well as a full bit decomposition of the input. Although this protocol
was developed initially for secret-sharing, it can be implemented with homomorphic encryption as well.
The output of this comparison step is one bit stating whether or not the (squared) cosine similarity is
above the threshold τ .
8 The threshold cryptosystem should not be confused with the threshold similarity.
Algorithm 1 ThresholdCosine(SA,SB)
1: Alice and Bob generate the keys of the threshold homomorphic encryption
2: Alice receives ska, Bob receives skb and they both get the public key pk
3: Alice and Bob compute Enc(|SA ∩ SB |) = ScalarProduct(SA, SB)
4: Alice applies the multiplication gate from [6] to obtain Enc(|SA ∩ SB |2)
5: Alice computes Enc(|SA|) and sends it to Bob
6: Bob computes Enc(|SA|) |SB | = Enc(|SA| × |SB |)
7: Alice computes Enc(|SA ∩ SB |2) b = Enc(b|SA ∩ SB |2)
8: Bob computes Enc(|SA| × |SB |) a = Enc(a|SA| × |SB |)
9: Alice and Bob use the integer comparison protocol of [23] on Enc(b|SA ∩ SB |2) and Enc(a|SA| × |SB |)
10: if Enc(b|SA ∩ SB |2) > Enc(a|SA| × |SB |) then
11: output 1 to state that Alice and Bob are τ -similar
12: else
13: output 0
14: end if
Theorem 1 (Threshold cosine similarity). The protocol ThresholdCosine is private with respect
to a passive adversary and returns 1 if two nodes are τ -similar and 0 otherwise. The protocol has a
communication complexity of O(l) bits and a computational cost of O(l), for l being the size of the
binary vectors representing the profiles.
Proof. All the communication exchanged between Alice and Bob is done using a homomorphic en-
cryption scheme with semantic security, therefore the encrypted messages exchanged do not leak any
information about their content. Moreover as the encryption scheme is a threshold version, neither
Alice nor Bob alone can decrypt the messages and learn their content. The multiplication gate [6]
as well as the integer comparison protocol [23] are also semantically secure, which therefore guar-
antees that the protocol is secure against a passive adversary. Regarding the correctness, it is easy
to see from the execution of the protocol that if Alice and Bob are τ -similar then this will result in
Enc(b|SA ∩ SB|2) > Enc(a|SA| × |SB|) when the integer comparison protocol is executed (and therefore
an output of 1) and in 0 otherwise. The multiplication gate and the integer comparison protocols are
independent of l and can be considered as having constant complexity (both in terms of communi-
cation and computation) for the analysis. On the other hand, the protocol ScalarProduct requires the
exchange of O(l) bits between Alice and Bob as well as O(l) computations [13]. This results in a similar
complexity for the global protocol ThresholdCosine.
4 Differentially Private Similarity Computation
Cryptography gives us the tools to compute any distributed function without revealing any other
information than the output of the function itself and while removing the need for a trusted third
party. This is a strong privacy guarantee but at the same time, this does not preclude the possibility
that the output itself might leak information about the private inputs of participants. For instance,
suppose that a deterministic computation of the similarity is performed and that it outputs 1 as
similarity value. In this situation, both nodes know that they exactly have the same profile. Differential
privacy [9] precisely aims at addressing the problem of what can be inferred about the inputs from
the output of a computation by adding some randomization to it. In that respect, differential privacy
can be seen as an orthogonal but complementary notion to cryptography as it addresses a different
issue. Therefore, in order to get the best of both worlds, the main idea is to combine them by using
cryptographic techniques to compute securely a differentially private algorithm.
4.1 Differential Privacy
Apart from the traditional cryptographic definition of privacy, we are also interested in a recent notion
called differential privacy [9]. Two inputs XA and XB are said to differ in at most one element if they
are both equal except for possibly one entry of the inputs. For instance, if XA and XB would be
databases, it would mean that they are identical except for one row.
Definition 5 (Differential privacy [9]). A randomized function K gives −differential privacy if
for all possible inputs XA and XB differing in at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(XA) ∈ S)] ≤ exp()× Pr[K(XB) ∈ S)]. (4)
This probability is taken over all the coin tosses of K. (Range(K) is the range of the function K and
exp refers to the exponential function.)
Originally, differential privacy was developed within the context of private data analysis and the
main guarantee is that if a differentially private mechanism is applied on a dataset composed of the
personal data of individuals, no output would become significantly more (or less) probable whether
or not a participant removes his data from the dataset. This means that for an adversary observing
the output of the mechanism, he only gains a negligible advantage from the presence (or absence) of
a particular individual in the database. This statement is a statistical property about the behavior
of the mechanism (function) and holds independently of the auxiliary knowledge that the adversary
might have gathered. More specifically, even if the adversary knows the whole database but one
individual row, a mechanism satisfying differential privacy still protects the privacy of this individual.
The parameter  is public and may take different values depending on the application (for instance it
could be 0.01, 0.1 or even 0.25). Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith have designed a general technique,
called Laplacian mechanism [11], that achieves -differential privacy for a function f by adding random
noise to the true answer. The amount of noise that has to be added is directly proportional to the
sensitivity of the function, which measures how much the output of a function can change with respect
to a small change in the input [11].
Definition 6 ((Global) sensitivity [11]). For f : D → R, the sensitivity of f is
GS(f) = max
XA,XB∈D
‖f(XA)− f(XB)‖1 (5)
for all XA, XB differing in at most one element, where D is the domain of the function (for instance
for binary vectors of l bits, D = {0, 1}l).
The Laplacian mechanism achieves -differential privacy by adding noise directly proportional to
GS(f) and .
Theorem 2 (Laplacian mechanism [11]). For f : D → R, a randomized function K achieves
-differential privacy if it releases on input x
K(x) = f(x) + Lap(
GS(f)

) (6)
for GS(f) the sensitivity of the function f and Lap is a randomly generated noise according to the
Laplacian distribution parametrized by GS(f) .
The smaller the value of , the higher the privacy but also, as a result, the higher the impact might
be on the utility of the resulting output. The following lemma also shows that differential privacy is a
“natural” notion that composes well.
Lemma 1 (Composition and post-processing [18]). If a randomized algorithm A runs k algo-
rithms A1,. . . , Ak where each Ai is -differentially private, and outputs a function of the results (i.e
A(x) = g(A1(x), . . . , Ak(x) for some probabilistic algorithm g) then A is k-differentially private.
4.2 Differentially Private Similarity
We define two profiles SA and SB as neighbors if they are the same except for one particular item.
Note that for simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider only neighboring profiles of the
same size. For instance, SA is a neighbor of SB (and vice versa) if it is identical except for one item
that may have been replaced to obtain the profile SB. If the two profiles are represented as binary
vectors, they are neighbors if their Hamming distance is 0 or 2 (i.e. ‖SA⊕SB‖ ∈ {0, 2}). The following
lemma states the sensitivity of the squared cosine similarity. (Treatment for the differentially private
computation of the scalar product can be found in Appendix B.)
Lemma 2 (Sensitivity – squared cosine similarity). The sensitivity of the function
ExactSquaredCosine is at most 2min(|SA|,|SB |)+1|SA|×|SB | .
Proof. Consider three different profiles SA, SB and SC , represented as binary vectors of same size,
such that SB and SC are neighbors. The computation of the cosine similarity between SA and SB
requires to compute two quantities: (1) the squared size of the set intersection |SA ∩ SB|2 and (2) the
multiplication of the lengths of SA and SB (i.e. |SA| × |SB|). Replacing an object from SB to obtain
SC will only increase (or decrease) the value of the set intersection by 1 at most. Moreover, replacing
an object from SB will not change size of the profile |SC |. Therefore
GS(Cosine2) = max
SA,SB ,SC
SB ,SC neighbors
‖sim(SA, SB)− sim(SA, SC)‖ = max
SA,SB ,SC
SB ,SC neighbors
∥∥∥∥ |SA ∩ SB|2 − |SA ∩ SC |2|SA| × |SB|
∥∥∥∥
= max
SA,SB
∥∥∥∥ |SA ∩ SB|2 − (|SA ∩ SB| ± 1)2|SA| × |SB|
∥∥∥∥ = maxSA,SB
∥∥∥∥±2|SA ∩ SB| − 1|SA| × |SB|
∥∥∥∥
And then substituting the max quantifier yields:
=
2|SA ∩ SB|+ 1
|SA| × |SB| ≤
2 min(|SA|, |SB|) + 1
|SA| × |SB| .
There are several ways to achieve -differential privacy in a distributed context. For instance, if we
assume that Alice and Bob have access to a semi-trusted party that does not collude with any of the
two nodes that computes their similarity, it can be used to help Alice and Bob during the similarity
computation. This is the case for instance in the gossip-on-behalf protocol (Appendix A) in which
another node acts as an anonymizer. The anonymizer is semi-trusted because although it is used to
connect anonymously two nodes, it is not trusted to the point of having access to the content of the
messages exchanged between them due to the semantic encryption scheme used. Another possible way
to achieve differential privacy would be for the two nodes to add the noise themselves directly when
executing the protocol for similarity computation.
Differential privacy via two-party computation. For instance, suppose that Alice and Bob
want to release the result of the scalar product between their two profiles. At the end of the proto-
col, Alice and Bob could both simply add independently generated random noise with distribution
Lap(1 ) using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme. Afterwards, they could cooperate
to perform the threshold decryption (which remember is not the same as the threshold similarity
computation) and they would both get to learn the perturbed scalar product. Finally, Alice may sub-
tract her own noise from the released output to recover only a version of the similarity that has been
randomized with Bob’s noise (which she cannot remove).
Differential privacy via semi-trusted third party. In the context of gossip-on-behalf (Ap-
pendix A), the node that acts as an anonymizer to set up the bidirectional anonymous channel could
also generate some random noise and add it to the similarity value that has been computed by using
the homomorphic property of the cryptosystem. Afterwards, the two nodes that have been involved
in the similarity computation would recover the result using the threshold decryption. The following
algorithm describes this procedure.
Algorithm 2 DifferentialSquaredCosine(SA,SB,)
1: Alice and Bob generate the keys of the threshold homomorphic encryption
2: Alice receives skA, Bob receives skB and they both get the public key pk
3: Alice and Bob compute Enc(|SA ∩ SB |2) = ScalarProduct(SA, SB)2
4: Alice and Bob gives to the node acting as the anonymizer Enc(|SA ∩ SB |2) as well as the sizes of their profiles |SA|
and |SB |
5: The anonymizer computes the squared cosine similarity Enc( |SA∩SB |
2
|SA|×|SB | ) and adds Laplacian noise parametrized by
GS(Cosine2)

= 2min(|SA|,|SB |)+1
×|S1|×|S2| using the homomorphic property
6: The anonymizer sends the perturbed squared cosine similarity (which is homomorphically encrypted) to Alice and
Bob
7: Alice and Bob cooperate to decrypt the homomorphically encrypted value and get as output
(ExactSquaredCosine(SA, SB) + Lap(
2min(|SA|,|SB |)+1
×|SA|×|SB | ))
Theorem 3 (Protocol for differential squared cosine). The protocol DifferentialSquaredCosine is
private with respect to a passive adversary and -differentially private. The protocol has a communi-
cation complexity of O(l) bits and a computational cost of O(l), for l the size of the binary vectors
representing the profiles.
Proof. All the communication exchanged between Alice and Bob are done using a homomorphic en-
cryption scheme with semantic security, therefore the encrypted messages exchanged do not leak any
information about their content. Moreover as the encryption scheme is a threshold version, it means
that neither Alice nor Bob alone can decrypt the messages and learn their content. At the end of
the protocol providing that the anonymizer does not collude either with Alice or Bob, Alice and Bob
only get to learn (ExactSquaredCosine(SA, SB) + Lap(
2min(|SA|,|SB |)+1
×|SA|×|SB | ), which ensures the -differential
property of the protocol. Moreover, because of the use of the protocol ScalarProduct as a subroutine,
the protocol DifferentialSquaredCosine has a communication cost of O(l) bits as well as a computational
cost of O(l) (we consider here that the threshold decryption has constant complexity and is negligible
with respect to the cost of the scalar product).
Note that in this protocol, where the noise needed to reach differential privacy is added by the
semi-trusted third party, it needs to know the value of |SA| and |SB| (or at least an upper bound on
these values) to be able to add noise tailored to the sensitivity of the function.
Differentially private threshold similarity. Regarding the threshold similarity, it is important
to notice that it is meaningless to add some random noise to a binary value (for instance the output of
the threshold similarity), because it amounts to flipping this value with some non-negligible probability.
Instead, the most direct way to achieve differential privacy is to add the noise before the application of
the threshold function. The following observation states that this does not hurt the privacy guarantee
obtained.
Observation 1 (Impact of threshold on privacy) Applying the Laplacian mechanism before the
threshold function does not hurt the differential privacy guarantee.
Proof. Suppose that we have some output of a function f to which we have added some Laplacian noise
calibrated to the sensitivity GS(f) of the function as well as . As stated by Lemma 1 as this output
is -differentially private, performing some pre-determined post-processing on it such as applying a
threshold function before releasing it has no impact on the privacy guarantees. Therefore, the threshold
function is by itself -differentially private if it is fed with some similarity measure that has been
computed with a -differentially private algorithm.
In the previous observation as well as in the context of Lemma 1, note that k = 1 as only one
differential privacy mechanism (namely A1 = f) is applied. The threshold function itself corresponds
to g as it only counts as a post-processing step whose input is not the original profiles of nodes but
rather the output of a differentially private mechanism.
5 Utility Analysis
In this section, we are interested in evaluating the impact of differential privacy on the utility of the
application.
Theoretical analysis. In particular, we are interested in measuring the amount of false negatives
induced by applying differential privacy on a specific similarity metric. A false negative arises when
the protocol outputs that two nodes are not τ -similar while in fact they are. In particular, we have
derived an equation that takes the threshold value (τ) and the privacy parameter () as parameters
and computes the probability of having false negatives when we use the differentially private similarity
metric. This equation may be use to guide and set up the different parameters of the algorithms and
also to measure the achievable trade-off between utility and privacy. We focus primarily on false
negatives for the analysis because we believe that a high rate of false negatives will have a big impact
on the utility while a high rate of false positives will mainly hurt privacy. However, the rate of false
positives can be also derived straightforwardly by following the same approach we used to compute
the rate of false negatives.
In our model, the parameter l is the total number of items in the domain of items (which we assume
to be a finite domain) and lA = |SA| and lB = |SB| are the sizes of the profiles of Alice and Bob.
The random variable S represents the number of items in common between any two profiles picked at
random with the given sizes lA and lB (i.e the size of the set intersection |SA ∩ SB|).
Lemma 3 (Hypergeometric distribution [15]). S ∼ Hypergeometric(max(lA, lB),min(lA, lB), l),
where l is the total number of items in the domain (which is the size of the binary vectors).
Proof. Let min be the set which has the smallest size among the two sets (we assumed it is SA without
loss of generality). Fix min, and let Bob (owner of set SB), pick lB items from the domain of size
l without replacements. A pick is successful if the item picked is also contained within the set min,
hence the number of possible success is at most lB. This corresponds exactly to the definition of the
Hypergeometric distribution.
Remember that the utility is measured as the percentage of similarity measures that does not
count as a false negative after the noise has been added and that the similarity value is S2/(lAlB).
Definition 7 (Utility function). The utility function is:
u(lA, lB, l, τ, ) = 1− P (N ≤ τ − S
2
lAlB
| S
2
lAlB
> τ) = = 1−
min(lA,lB)∑
s=d√lAlBτe
fS(s)FN (τ − s2lAlB )
1− FS
(√
lAlBτ
) ,
for S ∼ Hypergeometric(max(lA, lB),min(lA, lB), l). The τ parameter can be chosen by substituting
the desired acceptance rate of the threshold similarity (without taking into account the error caused
by the addition of noise) into the inverse cumulative density function (CDF) of the Hypergeometric
distribution. This is a function of lA and lB assuming that l is fixed a priori and it corresponds to
an integer, which when divided by the minimum size among both sets, gives the threshold τ . To
summarize, we have τ = CDF−1(max(lA, lB),min(lA, lB), l, r)/min(lA, lB), where r is the desired
acceptance rate. The utility function can be used by nodes to set the privacy parameter  dynamically
depending on the size of the sets of the two nodes (see Appendix C for more details).
Experimental evaluation. We have also studied experimentally the proposed mechanisms in the
context of a fully decentralized clustering algorithm [4] and evaluate the achievable trade-off between
utility (as measured by the quality of the global clustering) and privacy. The clustering algorithm
groups nodes according to their interests. In the baseline implementation of the clustering algorithm
(which we refer simply as “baseline” in the sequel), each node samples the network and exchanges a
digest of its profile that is a Bloom filter representation of its vector profile, which it uses to compute
its squared cosine similarity with other nodes. Based on that value, each node iteratively sorts its
clustering view and retains the c closest nodes according to the computed similarity metric (c is set
to 10 in our experiments). After a predetermined number of cycles when the protocol converges, each
node should end up with the c most similar (closest) nodes in its view. (More details about this
algorithm are available in [4].)
We used a dataset from delicious in which users tags items (i.e. URLs). The user profile is repre-
sented as a vector of tagged items such that there is a 1 in each vector entry corresponding to an item
a user has tagged and 0 otherwise. In our experiments, we compare two models against the baseline
model. The first one is a threshold similarity protocol, where nodes exchange their Bloom filters only
if the threshold protocol presented in Algorithm 2, outputs 1. This protocol computes privately the
similarity measure and outputs 1 if the similarity between the two nodes exceeds the predetermined
threshold τ . If a node has in its view less than c nodes whose similarity is above τ , the rest of the
view is chosen at random and the Bloom filters are not transmitted. The second model, which is the
threshold differentially private protocol (TDP), is a variant of the threshold version in which we added
the property of differential privacy to the cryptographic protocol. Computing similarity between two
nodes requires O(k) bits, where k is the size of the Bloom filter in the baseline model, while using
homomorphic encryption to encrypt each bitresult in an expansion factor of ∼ 2048 due to the size of
the generated ciphertexts.
Experimental setup. Evaluations are conducted through the simulation of a network of 500 nodes.
Each node represents a user, selected randomly from a dataset of 20, 000 users from a delicious trace
crawled in 2009. The resulting domain of items is a set of 1, 144, 000 URLs. In this datatset, the average
number of items tagged by a user is 323 and the average similarity between pair of users is 0.00004
(which explained why the chosen values for τ may seem relatively low). Specifically in the experiments,
we have set τ ∈ {10−3, 10−4, 7 × 10−5, 10−5, 1 × 10−5, 5 × 10−6} and  ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100}.
We evaluate our two models (threshold and TDP) according to the following metrics: the quality of
the clustering and the level of privacy. The quality of the clustering is measured by (i) the difference
between the cluster view obtained by Threshold and TDP protocols compared to the baseline and,
(ii) the recall when looking for items (previously removed from the profiles) in the profiles of the c
closest nodes. More specifically, clustering is done based on 90% of the tagged items of each user and
the remaining 10% is used to measure the recall by comparing how many of them are in the set of
tagged items of the view the node ends up with. The level of privacy is measured as the number of
Bloom filters exchanged as well as the chosen value for .
Results. In Figure 1, the x-axis represents the privacy parameter . The larger its value, the less
privacy (i.e. noise) is provided. We plot the experiments as a constant function with respect to .
The threshold line for a given τ should be interpreted as the upper bound of the performance of the
“private experiments” with the same value for τ . Therefore, the less the number of the Bloom filters
exchanged, the better for the users’ privacy. The results obtained demonstrate that the number of
Bloom filters exchanged are up to half that of the baseline. Yet, for most of our choices of τ , the recall
and view quality in the threshold experiment are close to the one obtained with the baseline. Note
that, as observed on Figure 1b, the recall of the baseline is 0.26, which is mainly due to the sparsity
of the dataset. The exception being for the value of τ = 0.001 which turns out to be much higher
than the average similarity (0.00004), resulting in almost no exchange of Bloom filters (which has the
same effect has letting the nodes chosen their view at random). We observe that for some choices of
τ , adding privacy (in terms of noise) can even enhance the utility. For instance, when we add a large
amount of noise and that the threshold is extremely low, this will increase the number of false positives,
thus resulting in more exchanges of Bloom filters than with the use of the threshold alone without
the addition of noise. Finally, Figure 1d displays the convergence time obtained with τ = 0.00007.
The convergence plots for the view and the Bloom exchanges are similar to the one presented before.
Moreover, we observe that in all runs, the private protocols converges almost as fast as the baseline (in
less than 25 cycles) to their optimal value, with respect to the quality of the view and the recall. To
summarize, applying the threshold (respectively the TDP) protocol impacts only slightly the recall by
4% (respectively 12%) but reduces up to 80% the number of Bloom filters exchanged, thus providing
a higher privacy. Therefore, we can conclude that it is possible to achieve reliable clustering and high
recall even if instead of exchanging Bloom filters, we use a differentially private threshold mechanism
for computing the similarity between nodes.
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Fig. 1: Experimental results obtained with 500 nodes from Delicious for different values of  and τ .
6 Conclusion
Main results. The Web 2.0 has recently witnessed a proliferation of user generated content including
a large proportion of personal data. Preserving privacy is a major issue to be able to leverage this in-
formation to provide personalized services. Fully decentralized systems somehow protect users privacy
to be exposed to large companies, avoiding the “Big brother is watching you” syndrome. However, in
some sense this is an illusion as they might expose personal data to other users in the network. In this
paper, we have addressed this challenge by providing users with a way to compute their similarity with
respect to other users while preserving the privacy of their profiles. More precisely, we have introduced
a two-party threshold similarity protocol enabling a user to quantify her similarity with another user,
without revealing her profile and without requiring a trusted third party. We proved that the proposed
protocol is secure in the presence of a passive adversary. We have also proposed differentially private
protocols for the exact and threshold similarity and studied the impact of the noise generation on
the utility of the resulting similarity. To summarize, our work highlights the fact that cryptography
and differential privacy are two different but complementary notions. On one hand, differential privacy
gives strong privacy guarantees with respect to how much information can be learned about the inputs
of the participants from the (perturbed) output of a function. Thus, differential privacy helps us to
reason on which type of information can be safely released with respect to privacy. On the other hand,
cryptography, and more specifically secure multi-party computation, gives us the tools to compute a
distributed function in a secure and robust way and removes the need for a trusted third party, which
is of paramount importance in a decentralized setting. When possible, it seems therefore natural to
combine differential privacy and cryptography into an integrated approach as we have done for private
similarity computation in distributed systems.
Related work. Distributed noise generation has been addressed in the context of the secure
multi-party and differential privacy [10]. The resulting protocol has a greater complexity than our
approach, but on the other hand is secure against active (Byzantine) adversary. A protocol for nearest
neighbor search in distributed settings has been proposed in [27] but it was designed only within the
cryptography framework and not the differential privacy context. Therefore, if it is possible that some
privacy breach related to specific item in the profile may arise if the adversary has some background
knowledge. Differential private protocols have also been considered in centralized systems such as [20]
for analyzing the recommender system of Netflix with respect to differential privacy.
Future work. Currently, we have mainly focused on providing security with respect to a passive
adversary, which can be seen as a privacy analysis of how much knowledge can be inferred by an
adversary following the rules of the protocol but trying to extract as much information as possible
from the transcript of the communications seen, the output of the protocol and its own input. While
this is a first step, we plan as future work to address malicious participants (modeled by active
adversaries) that can cheat during the execution of the protocol. It might also be possible to add the
unlinkability property to the bidirectional anonymous channel to prevent an adversary from linking
two queries to the same honest node.
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A Gossip-on-Behalf
In gossip-on-behalf, the first node, Alice, starts by choosing at random another node C (that we refer
thereafter as Charlie) from her random sample (typically provided by a random peer sampling service
[17]). She then generates a pair of public key/secret key for this session and asks Charlie to select
a node at random (that we called Bob) as the second node that will be involved in the similarity
computation. Charlie does not disclose the identity of Bob to Alice (and vice versa), therefore acting
as an anonymizer. Afterwards, Charlie transmits the public key of Alice to Bob that will use it to
encrypt any data exchanged with Alice. Finally, Bob either generates also a pair of public key/secret
key for this session or a secret that will be used as the key of a symmetric cryptosystem (such as
AES) and transmits this to Bob encrypted with his public key via Charlie as a relay (this is similar
in spirit to the SSL authentication protocol). Alice and Bob now share a secure anonymous channel.
The communication between Alice and Bob goes through Charlie but as it is encrypted, this forbids
Charlie from learning any information exchanged during their interactions. One important security
assumption is that Charlie does not collude neither with Alice nor with Bob, or otherwise this would
break the anonymity property of the channel.
B Scalar Product
Lemma 4 (Sensitivity – scalar product). The sensitivity of the function ScalarProduct is 1.
Proof. Consider three different profiles SA, SB and SC , represented as binary vectors of the same
size, such that SB and SC are neighbors. Replacing an object from SB by another object to obtain SC
increases (or decrease) the value of the scalar product by 1 at most, and therefore the sensitivity of the
scalar product is 1.
Algorithm 3 DifferentialScalarProduct(SA,SB,)
1: Alice and Bob generate the keys of the threshold homomorphic encryption
2: Alice receives skA, Bob receives skB and they both get the public key pk
3: Alice and Bob compute Enc(|SA ∩ SB |) = ScalarProduct(SA, SB)
4: Alice generates Laplacian noise parametrized by LapA(
1

) and computes
Enc(|SA ∩ SB |)⊕ Enc(LapA( 1 )) = Enc(|SA ∩ SB |+ LapA( 1 )) and sends the result to Bob
5: Bob generates Laplacian noise parametrized by LapB(
1

) and computes
Enc(|SA ∩ SB |+ LapA( 1 ))⊕ Enc(LapB( 1 )) = Enc(|SA ∩ SB |+ LapA( 1 ) + LapB( 1 ))
6: Alice and Bob cooperate to decrypt the homomorphically encrypted value and get as output
(|SA ∩ SB |+ LapA( 1 ) + LapB( 1 ))
Theorem 4 (Protocol for differential scalar product). The protocol DifferentialScalarProduct is
private with respect to a passive adversary and -differentially private. The protocol has a communi-
cation complexity of O(l) bits and a computational cost of O(l), for l the size of the binary vectors
representing the profiles.
Proof. All the communication exchanged between Alice and Bob are done using an homomorphic en-
cryption scheme with semantic security, therefore the encrypted messages exchanged do not leak any
information about their content. Moreover as the encryption scheme is a threshold version, it means
that neither Alice nor Bob alone can decrypt the messages and learn their content. At the end of the
protocol, Alice and Bob only get to learn (|SA∩SB|+LapA(1 )+LapB(1 )) which ensures the -differential
property of the protocol9. Moreover, because of the use of the protocol ScalarProduct as a subroutine,
the protocol DifferentialScalarProduct has a communication cost of O(l) bits and as well as a compu-
tational cost of O(l) (we consider here that the threshold decryption and the generation of Laplacian
noise have constant complexity and are negligible with respect to the cost of the scalar product).
C Utility Analysis
The utility function can be used by nodes to set the privacy parameter  dynamically depending on
the size of the sets of the two nodes. The probability that a node gets accepted is P (S2/(lAlB) > τ),
where τ is the public threshold value while the probability of getting rejected (false negative rate)
after adding the Laplacian noise is P (S2/(lAlB) +N ≤ τ) = P (N ≤ τ −S2/(lAlB)). This result in the
following utility function:
1− P (N ≤ γ| S
2
lAlB
> τ) = 1− P (N ≤ γ|S > θ) = 1− P (N ≤ γ ∧ S > θ)
1− Fs (θ) = 1−
∑
s>θ
∫ γ
−∞ fN,S(n, s) dn
1− Fs (θ)
= 1−
∑
s>θ
∫ γ
−∞ fN (n)fS(s) dn
1− FS (θ) = 1−
∑
s>θ
fS(s)
∫ γ
−∞ fN (n) dn
1− FS (θ) = 1−
∑
s>θ
fS(s)FN (γ)
1− FS (θ) ,
9 More precisely, Alice can learn (|SA∩SB |+LapB( 1 )) if she subtracts her own noise but this still preserves -differential
privacy (the same reasoning can be made for Bob).
where θ =
√
lAlBτ and γ = τ − S2lAlB . The upper limit of this sum is min(lA, lB) whereas the lower
limit is dθe. The above equation (which is a function of lA, lB, τ , , and l), when plotted with different
values of lA and lB, shows the effect of the privacy parameter  for a given τ and domain cardinality
l. Alternatively, we can also derive the probability of not having false positives or the probability of
not having false decisions as described below.
Definition 8 (Utility as the probability of not having false positives.).
U+(lA, lB, l, τ, ) = 1−
b√lAlBτc∑
s=0
fS(s)FN (
s2
lAlB
− τ)
FS
(b√lAlBτc) .
Definition 9 (Utility as the probability of not having false decisions.).
U† =
min(lA,lB)∑
s=0
fS (s)FN
(
d (s)
(
τ − s
2
lAlB
))
,
where
d(s) =
{
1 ifs ≤ b√lAlBτc
−1 ifs > b√lAlBτc
.
